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Leaving Judicial Review with the
Judiciary: The Misplaced Role of
Agency Deference in Tunney Act
Public Interest Review
Alexandra P. Clark*
Abstract
This Note explores the Tunney Act’s mechanism for judicial
review of consent decrees negotiated by the U.S. Department of
Justice and merging parties to remedy alleged antitrust issues.
The Tunney Act requires that the reviewing court only approve a
consent decree if it is “in the public interest.” This Note argues,
however, that courts have improperly circumscribed their review
by affording too much deference to the Department of Justice
when reviewing these consent decrees. This deference subverts
Congress’s intent in imposing judicial review and allows the
government and merging parties the opportunity to skirt
meaningful judicial review. As such, this Note concludes that
courts should reanimate their role in reviewing consent decrees
under the Tunney Act by affording a lower degree of deference to
the Department of Justice. It is the correct reading of both the
statute and the legislative history, it does not pose an
unconstitutional imbalance between the judicial and executive
branches, and it is critical to containing the harmful effects of
anticompetitive mergers.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Washington and Lee University School of
Law. Thank you to Professor Russell Miller for his advice and mentorship, and
to the editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review for making this Note
possible. Finally, thank you to my family, whose love and encouragement
inspire me to make my goals a reality.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2019, the Department of Justice (DOJ) approved a
megamerger between two of the largest wireless carriers in the
United States: Sprint and T-Mobile.1 The merging companies
received the DOJ’s blessing by negotiating a consent decree,2
containing terms with which Sprint and T-Mobile must comply
to proceed as a merged entity.3 Many, however, questioned the
DOJ’s wisdom in allowing further consolidation of the
telecommunications market by negotiating this consent decree.4
In fact, only five states signed on to the DOJ’s settlement
agreement with the companies.5 Eighteen other states instead
pursued litigation to enjoin the transaction.6 Fourteen states

1. See Justice Department Settles with T-Mobile and Sprint in Their
Proposed Merger by Requiring a Package of Divestitures to Dish, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST. (July 26, 2019), https://perma.cc/C5XV-RUPL (last updated July 30,
2019) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release] (announcing the terms under which the
DOJ and the companies agreed to settle in order to receive the government’s
approval of the deal).
2. Consent decrees are negotiated settlements between the enforcing
agency and defendant(s), in which the defendant agrees to specific restraints
on its future behavior in exchange for the government’s agreement to
terminate the case. C. PAUL ROGERS III ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 42 (4th ed. 2008).
3. See id. (stating that the consent decree requires that Sprint and
T-Mobile divest Sprint’s prepaid business to Dish Network and make certain
accommodations to Dish so that it can emerge as a viable competitor to the
combined firm); see also infra Part II (describing the DOJ’s use of consent
decrees for antitrust enforcement).
4. See, e.g., The Editorial Board, If You Own a Cellphone, You Should
Worry About the T-Mobile-Sprint Deal, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2019), https://
perma.cc/P5EH-TRMQ (“[The DOJ’s] contortions to approve the merger
demonstrate once again that the federal government has lost interest in
preventing corporate consolidation. Even the most obviously anti-competitive
deals, like this union of two companies that have long been bitter rivals, are
able to obtain the government’s consent.”).
5. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 1 (listing the participation of five
state Attorneys General: Nebraska, Kansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota).
6. See Lauren Hirsch, Texas and Nevada Are the Latest States to Defect
from the Lawsuit Against Sprint/T-Mobile Deal, CNBC (Nov. 25, 2019, 4:47
PM), https://perma.cc/SK2W-B9P5 (detailing the number of states that
continued to pursue injunction of the merger in court, though four states have
recently dropped their suits).
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ultimately pursued an action against the parties in federal
district court, alleging that the merger would substantially
lessen competition in the relevant market.7
Criticisms of the DOJ’s approval of the proposed merger
centered around then-Assistant Attorney General Makan
Delrahim, who managed the DOJ’s antitrust arm.8 Attention
focused on Mr. Delrahim was appropriate given the DOJ’s
structure: the DOJ’s antitrust head makes all final decisions
within the division regarding whether to prosecute or settle
major antitrust transactions.9 The nature of this consolidated
decision-making power, accompanied by the fact that Mr.
Delrahim’s position and the position’s direct superior—the
United States Attorney General—are appointed directly by the
President, means that antitrust decision-making at the DOJ
carries risk of political influence.10 In the T-Mobile-Sprint deal,
commentators accused Mr. Delrahim of succumbing to such
influence: he worked to defend corporate interests over that of
the public in shepherding the merger through the DOJ approval
process.11
This is the point at which Congress envisioned the judiciary
to intervene by enacting the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties

7. See New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179, 186
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (listing the state plaintiffs in the action). Following a bench
trial, the court denied the states’ request to enjoin the merger. See id. at 189
(denying the injunction request because it disagreed with the states’ case on
predicted anticompetitive effects and the state of the market going forward).
8. See Katie Benner & Cecilia Kang, How a Top Antitrust Official
Helped T-Mobile and Sprint Merge, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://
perma.cc/5EAJ-5NF7 (last updated Feb. 11, 2020) (“As the $26 billion
blockbuster merger between T-Mobile and Sprint teetered, . . . Makan
Delrahim . . . labored to rescue it behind the scenes . . . .”).
9. See infra Part IV.A.
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, Imagine That Donald Trump Has Almost No
Control Over Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2020), https://perma.cc/8PVBKGNT (proposing that Congress transform the DOJ “into an independent
agency, legally immunized from the president’s day-to-day control”).
11. See The Editorial Board, Why Is the Justice Department Treating
T-Mobile Like a Client?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/HNC3S9L4 (“Rather than defending the public interest, [Delrahim] was working to
defend T-Mobile’s interests.”).
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Act (the Tunney Act).12 The Tunney Act requires that the
DOJ— after having negotiated a consent decree with merging
parties to settle the government’s antitrust concerns—seek
enforcement of the decree in a United States district court.13
When deciding whether to enter a proposed consent decree into
force under the Tunney Act, the court must determine whether
the decree is “in the public interest.”14
Congress enacted the Tunney Act to charge the judiciary
with conducting an “independent”15 review of the DOJ’s decision
to settle a merger inquiry, and, in so doing, ensure that the court
does not dilute its review to mere “rubber stamping.”16 Courts,
however, interpret their Tunney Act duty as one that requires a
high degree of deference to the DOJ’s “prosecutorial
discretion.”17 Courts also interpret the Tunney Act review as one
12. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)
(“Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the United States under
this section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in
the public interest.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (referring to the statute as the “Tunney Act”).
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (stating that any proposed consent decree by the
United States must be filed with the district court for review).
14. See id. § 16(e)(1) (providing that judicial approval is conditioned on
the court’s determination that entry of the decree is in the public interest). The
Tunney Act applies to negotiated consent decrees that arise out of any alleged
violations of the federal antitrust laws, not just those arising from
anticompetitive mergers. See id. § 16(b) (mandating that “[a]ny proposal for a
consent judgment submitted by the United States for entry in any civil
proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust
laws” is subject to the procedural requirements promulgated by the Tunney
Act). Because most of the important caselaw developed under the Tunney Act
has been specific to consent decrees regarding mergers, that will be the focus
of this Note.
15. The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act: Hearings on S. 782 and
S. 1088 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 452 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Tunney Act Hearings]
(remarks by Sen. John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney).
16. See id. at 196 (“[W]e want the courts to do more than they have done
in the past. We want them to do more than just simply rubberstamp a
decree.”).
17. See Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1459–60 (“The court’s authority to review
the decree depends entirely on the government’s exercising its prosecutorial
discretion by bringing a case in the first place.”); see also United States v. SBC
Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (D.D.C. 2007) (stating that the Microsoft court
“based its decision on constitutional concerns that overriding prosecutorial
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that is narrow in scope—limited to the claims contained in the
DOJ’s complaint.18 As a result, the DOJ often negotiates the
consent decree prior to writing the complaint.19 This allows it to
game the review process: negotiate the settlement first and then
craft a complaint tailored to the specific concerns addressed in
the consent decree, ensuring a court’s easy approval.20 In so
doing, the DOJ retrofits the complaint and skirts meaningful
judicial review.21
The DOJ employed this strategy in its settlement in the
T-Mobile-Sprint deal.22 The DOJ filed an antitrust complaint
against the merging parties to enjoin the transaction and
simultaneously submitted a motion for court approval of the
DOJ’s proposed consent decree to settle the action and allow the
merger to proceed.23 By taking advantage of the court-created
rule that judicial review is limited only to the claims that the
DOJ resolved in the proposed consent decree, the government
deprives the reviewing court of the opportunity to scrutinize the
settlement in light of the public interest.24
The merger, which is now complete,25 illustrates the
problem with the judiciary’s restrained interpretation of its role
discretion to initiate antitrust suits infringes on the proper separation of
powers”). The DOJ is the federal government’s prosecuting body. See ROGERS
ET AL., supra note 2, at 36–37 (explaining the federal antitrust law enforcement
framework). Thus, courts speak of agency deference in this context as
“prosecutorial discretion.” See Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 369, 372 (2010) (explaining that
prosecutorial discretion is “a kind of Chevron inquiry”).
18. See infra notes 123–125 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 124–125 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text.
22. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 1 (stating that the DOJ filed both
the complaint and the proposed consent decree with the court on July 26,
2019).
23. See id. (noting that the DOJ sought to block the proposed transaction
and, “[a]t the same time,” filed a proposed settlement to resolve the
government’s concerns).
24. See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text.
25. See T-Mobile Completes Merger with Sprint to Create the New
T-Mobile, T-MOBILE USA (Apr. 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/5MGT-9UL6
(“[T-Mobile] announced today that it has officially completed its merger with
Sprint Corporation to create the New T-Mobile, a supercharged Un-carrier
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under the Tunney Act:26 it allows the DOJ to retrofit complaints
to match the consent decree and circumvent meaningful “public
interest” review.27 Thus, the court’s continual abdication of its
statutory duty to substantively engage in Tunney Act review
deprives the public of assurance that only those settlements that
are in the public interest are enforced.28
This Note, therefore, focuses on determining the
appropriate level of agency deference that the judiciary should
afford the DOJ when administering the Tunney Act’s public
interest review. Following this introduction, Part I of this Note
describes the importance of the consent decree in government
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws and the Tunney Act’s
role in that process. Part II identifies the judiciary’s early
interpretations of the Tunney Act’s public interest standard,
which produced caselaw prescribing a high level of deference to
the DOJ during the review. Part III examines Congress’s
attempt to rectify this deferential review through its 2004
amendments to the Tunney Act. Part III details important
legislative history that reveals the legislature’s effort to double
down on mandating exacting judicial review. Part III then
proceeds by summarizing the negligible effect of the 2004
amendments on Tunney Act jurisprudence—where the caselaw
stands today.
Part IV argues that courts have erroneously afforded too
much deference to the DOJ in applying Tunney Act review. Part
V supports the argument using these three sources: Congress,
the U.S. Constitution, and antitrust policy. Part V offers the
recent United States v. CVS Health29 as evidence of a potential
shift among the courts with regard to their role under the
Tunney Act. This Note proposes that CVS Health sets forth a
jurisprudential framework that future reviewing courts should

that will deliver a transformative 5G network.”). The district court approved
the consent decree on April 14, 2020. See United States v. Deutsche Telekom
AG, No. 19-2232, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65096, at *24–25 (D.D.C. Apr. 14,
2020) (concluding that the consent decree was in the public interest).
26. See infra notes 123–125 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 126–128 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. 407 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2019).
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adopt.30 Finally, this Note concludes by proposing that courts
reevaluate their role under the Tunney Act and apply an
exacting review of the DOJ’s proposed consent decrees. A
scrutinizing Tunney Act review provides a meaningful check on
the DOJ to ensure that the agency—acting under the country’s
executive authority31—is serving the public interest by
“faithfully execut[ing]”32 the federal antitrust laws.33
I.

THE CONSENT DECREE AND THE TUNNEY ACT

The consent decree plays a critical role in the government’s
effective enforcement of federal antitrust laws.34 The Tunney
Act administers the procedures under which the DOJ must
comply when seeking entry of these consent decrees.35 Thus, in
proposing changes to the interpretation of the Tunney Act’s role
in the consent decree process, this Note first assesses the power
of the consent decree, the risks inherent to “cheap decrees,”36
and the role of the judiciary in ensuring that only decrees
advancing the public interest are entered into force.
A.

Federal Antitrust Enforcement: The DOJ and FTC’s
Concurrent Jurisdiction

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and DOJ both
enforce the federal antitrust laws, and each do so in part
through the use of the consent decree.37 Consent decrees are a
frequently used, important method of enforcing the federal
antitrust laws for both agencies.38 However, their enforcement,

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See infra Part V.
See infra notes 210–220 and accompanying text.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra Part I.A.2.
See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (listing the procedural requirements).
See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part IV.A.2.
See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction, and the procedure under which each agency must
adhere when enforcing a consent decree are distinct.39
The FTC and DOJ share government enforcement
responsibilities of federal antitrust laws.40 Private plaintiffs also
have standing to bring federal antitrust suits,41 and state
governments may sue under federal antitrust laws either
alleging injury to the government or through parens patriae
litigation.42
The federal antitrust enforcement scheme features
overlapping—but not identical—authority by the FTC and
DOJ.43 Both the FTC and DOJ have jurisdiction to enforce the
Clayton Act44—a civil statute that, among other things,
prohibits anticompetitive mergers.45 The DOJ has exclusive
federal jurisdiction over the Sherman Act,46 which contains both
civil and criminal enforcement provisions, and the FTC has
39. See infra Part IV.A.2 (explaining that the Tunney Act dictates consent
decree procedures for the DOJ only).
40. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36–37 (stating that the DOJ and
FTC share the federal responsibility for antitrust enforcement).
41. See Clayton Act of 1914 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (providing that any
private party “injured in business or property by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws may sue”).
42. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36 (explaining that state
governments have the option of either suing to enforce their own state
antitrust laws or bringing federal antitrust lawsuits on behalf of state
residents).
43. See id. (distinguishing FTC and DOJ jurisdiction).
44. Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27.
45. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36 (“Responsibility for Clayton
Act . . . enforcement is shared by the [DOJ] and the Federal Trade
Commission.”); Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 18
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting
commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part
of the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line
of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 4 (stating the Attorney General’s authority to
“institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain” violations under the
Sherman Act).
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exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the Federal Trade Commission
Act,47 a purely civil statute.48 Congress enacted the Federal
Trade Commission Act to mirror the civil jurisdiction that the
DOJ already retained through the Sherman and Clayton Acts
“as well as to cover any loopholes in those statutes.”49 The
statutory scheme only grants the FTC with the authority to
enforce statutes that provide civil remedies; the FTC does not
have authority to prosecute criminal antitrust violations.50
Thus, the FTC and DOJ both play an important role in
enforcing the federal antitrust laws and both employ consent
decrees as part of their strategy of effective enforcement.51 Their
diverging authority to administer the provisions of the statutes,
principally the DOJ’s civil and criminal jurisdiction versus the
FTC’s purely civil jurisdiction, is critical to Tunney Act
jurisprudence.52 Also telling, as explained in more detail in Part
IV.A.2, infra, is that the Tunney Act only dictates the process by
which the DOJ enforces its consent decrees, not the FTC.
B.

The Role of the Consent Decree

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act53 provides the FTC and DOJ
with a thirty-day window to review large corporate mergers
before the transaction’s closing.54 During this period, either the

47. Id. §§ 41–58.
48. See id. § 45(a) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and directed
to prevent [parties] from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce . . . .”); see also ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36 (explaining the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Act).
49. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 36–37 (explaining the role of the
Federal Trade Commission Act in federal antitrust enforcement). But see FTC
v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 310–12 (1934) (characterizing the
FTC’s ability to pursue antitrust violations that “fall short of a Sherman Act
violation”).
50. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 43 (“The FTC has no Sherman Act
and no criminal jurisdiction . . . .”).
51. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
52. See infra Part IV.A.2.
53. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15
U.S.C. § 18a.
54. See id. § 18a(b) (prescribing the procedure for the mandatory “waiting
period”).
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DOJ or the FTC55 determines whether the merger implicates
antitrust concerns and then, based on that determination, either
allows the transaction to consummate or decides that the
merger warrants further investigation.56 If the merger proceeds
to the investigation phase—and the DOJ or FTC begin
identifying anticompetitive issues with the merger—the
merging parties and the agency often discuss opportunities for
settlement.57 A settlement culminates in a negotiated consent
decree, where the merging parties agree to divest certain assets
to a competitor or agree to certain behavior in order to alleviate
the government’s concerns.58

55. See id. § 18a(b)(1)(A) (stating that the thirty-day window begins “on
the date of the receipt by the Federal Trade Commission and the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice”). Importantly, though the FTC and DOJ both receive the premerger
notification and the materials that accompany it, only one of the agencies will
review it. See Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://perma.cc/BR38-4PKJ [hereinafter Merger Review
Process] (“Parties proposing a deal file with both the FTC and DOJ, but only
one antitrust agency will review the proposed merger.”). The FTC and DOJ
engage in a “clearance process” for each merger, during which the two agencies
consult to decide which should be “cleared” to review the merger. See id.
(explaining the clearance process).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 18(e)(1)–(2) (explaining that the agencies may request
additional information from the parties and extend the waiting period for the
time it takes the parties to comply with the request, and an additional thirty
days after they complied for the agencies to review the information). The
agencies call this request for additional information a “second request.” See
FED. TRADE COMM’N PREMERGER NOTIFICATION OFF., WHAT IS THE PREMERGER
NOTIFICATION PROGRAM? 1 (2009), https://perma.cc/RZT7-NARK (PDF)
(describing the procedural timeline of a “second request”).
57. See Merger Review Process, supra note 55 (stating that the length of
the investigative phase can “be extended by agreement between the parties
and the government in an effort to resolve any remaining issues without
litigation”).
58. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY
GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 7 (2004), https://perma.cc/3BVD-6A8H (PDF)
[hereinafter DOJ MERGER REMEDIES] (explaining that consent decrees take
two forms: “one address[ing] the structure of the market, the other the conduct
of the merged firm”); Merger Review Process, supra note 55 (“In this situation
the parties may resolve the concerns about the merger by agreeing to sell off
the particular overlapping business unit or assets of one of the merging
parties, but then complete the remainder of the merger as proposed.”); James
Rob Savin, Tunney Act ‘96: Two Decades of Judicial Misapplication, 46 EMORY
L.J. 363, 365 (1997) (“Under the purview of a consent decree, the defendant
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Consent decrees are common and sometimes the “only
realistic” method of achieving effective antitrust enforcement.59
At least 80 percent of government antitrust cases are settled
rather than tried, and such settlements generally occur by way
of a consent decree.60 The enforcing agency and defendants each
are motivated to settle by consent decree.61 The government’s
motivations to settle stem from efficacy concerns, cost savings,
and a “desire to achieve a maximum utilization of the limited
staff that is available for antitrust prosecutions.”62
The merging parties want to settle in lieu of defending the
transaction in litigation for three primary reasons: (1) to employ
the prima facie evidence exemption in any subsequent litigation
under the Clayton Act,63 (2) to avoid the “heavy burdens” that
accompany the uncertainty of a pending merger litigation—
which include massive legal fees, distraction of executives, and
business operation limbo,64 and (3) to enjoy the favorable
publicity that accompanies a consummated merger (as opposed
accepts specific limitations on his future conduct, and the government
indicates its willingness to terminate the suit on those terms.”).
59. See Savin, supra note 58, at 365–66 (“Given the limited resources of
the [DOJ’s] Antitrust Division, the only realistic means the government has to
provide effective antitrust enforcement is the consent decree.”); ROGERS ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 42 (explaining that both the FTC and DOJ employ the consent
decree tool).
60. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (“Most government antitrust
cases (eighty percent or more) never are tried but rather are settled, generally
by a device known as a consent decree.”).
61. See Savin, supra note 58, at 365–66 (summarizing the motivations to
settle specific to the government and the merging parties).
62. See Consent Decree Program of the Dep’t of Justice: Hearings Before
the Antitrust Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. 2–3
(1957) [hereinafter 1957 Consent Decree Hearings] (statement of Rep.
Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Antitrust Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary) (explaining the various motivations for defendants to settle an
antitrust litigation).
63. See Savin, supra note 58, at 366 (explaining the exemption contained
in the Clayton Act that prevents a pre-trial consent decree from being used as
prima facie evidence against the defendant in subsequent litigations); see also
supra note 65 and accompanying text.
64. See Savin, supra note 58, at 366 (stating that the various costs of
litigation “are likely to lead defendants to seek a consent settlement if the
challenged practice is not vital to their business or if they feel their case is not
a sure winner”).
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to the negative publicity of a protracted antitrust battle).
Consent decrees are also attractive to the merging parties
because they do not constitute an admission of guilt and are not
an adjudication on the merits of the alleged violations.65
C.

The Danger of “Cheap Decrees”

“Cheap decrees” are decrees that are “questionable because
they have been negotiated for reasons other than remedying”
the alleged antitrust violations or because they contain “terms
that do not substantially advance the public interest.”66
Inappropriate motivations for settling an antitrust concern by
consent decree include “reluctance or fear to try the case,”
“concern about the costs of trial,” or worry that further
investigation or discovery may reveal a weaker case for the

65. See id. at 365 (“[T]ypically, [the decree] states that the defendant
denies the substantive allegations of the complaint and that the decree is
entered ‘without trial or adjudication . . . .’”). This is especially important with
regard to subsequent private enforcement of antitrust laws under the Clayton
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (discussing judgments obtained through antitrust
enforcement); see also supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. A litigated
judgment or decree against a defendant may be used as prima facie evidence
against that defendant in future litigation, unless the case was settled by
consent decree prior to any trial occurring. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (stating that
the prima facie evidence provision “does not apply to consent judgments or
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken”). If a case settles by
consent decree prior to trial, therefore, the parties can proceed with any
subsequent litigation without fear that the government may use previous
litigation against them. This can serve as a major motivating factor for
defendants to settle an antitrust litigation prior to trial. See Savin, supra note
58, at 366 (stating that “[t]he largest inducement for the defendant to settle”
is the prima facie evidence exemption for pre-trial consent decrees).
66. See J. THOMAS ROSCH, COMM’R, FED. TRADE COMM’N, REMARKS BEFORE
THE 18TH ST. GALLEN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION LAW FORUM: CONSENT
DECREES: IS THE PUBLIC GETTING ITS MONEY’S WORTH? 9–10 (Apr. 7, 2011),
https://perma.cc/57QJ-6S33 (PDF) (explaining the adverse effects of
improperly negotiated decrees). This Note does not assume that these cheap
decrees are the norm, nor even that they occur with a certain frequency. See,
e.g., DOJ MERGER REMEDIES, supra note 58, at 4 (establishing that, as part of
DOJ guidance for staff negotiating consent decrees, “restoring competition is
the only appropriate goal with respect to crafting merger remedies”). This
Note, however, does argue that some consent decrees fail to serve the public
interest and Congress sought to solve that failure by imposing a
non-deferential Tunney Act review. See infra Part IV.A.
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government than anticipated.67 These reasons—though “wholly
legitimate” as rationales to settle in the context of litigation
between two private parties—do not meet the public interest
mandate imposed upon the federal antitrust enforcement
agencies.68
Cheap decrees fail to serve the public interest in two key
ways.69 First, the government, perhaps motivated by fear of
what may occur by pursuing a full adjudicative proceeding on
the merits, may agree to a cheap decree that does not properly
remedy the alleged antitrust violation by under-settling.70 In
other words, the agency might not aggressively pursue all
appropriate remedies because—in an effort to settle—it agreed
to more lenient terms than what it could have otherwise been
able to achieve in court.71 Or, the terms are insufficient to
address the antitrust violations that would have been fully
assessed following discovery and a hearing.72 Decrees that
underdeliver fail to meet the public interest standard because it

67. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10 (summarizing the reasons for which
the government may choose to settle a case).
68. See id. (stating that “decree[s] that reflect[] the private and personal
considerations of those involves in the litigation” should not be entered into
force). Despite the distinct processes through which decrees are pursued and
entered into force at the DOJ and FTC both are subject to a public interest
standard. Compare Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(e)(1) (requiring that a consent decree proposed by the DOJ meet a public
interest standard prior to its entry into force), with Johnson Prods. Co. v. FTC,
549 F.2d 35, 38 (7th Cir. 1977) (explaining that the FTC, “unlike a private
litigant, must act in furtherance of the public interest” in determining whether
to enter a consent decree).
69. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 9–12 (explaining that an improper
consent decree may underdeliver or overdeliver on the remedy’s scope).
70. See 1957 Consent Decree Hearings, supra note 62, at 3 (“[A] consent
settlement by its very nature involves the process of compromise in the
negotiations by attorneys for each side.”).
71. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 128 (statement of
Harold E. Kohn) (“Even the best intentioned and most competent attorneys
employed by the Justice Department may occasionally overlook the full
implications of their own acts or be inclined to make a settlement that is less
than desirable from the public point of view in order to avoid being
overburdened.”).
72. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10 (asserting that the agencies should
be assured, prior to seeking to enforce a decree, that the “decree appropriately
remedies the violations”).
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does not satisfy the agency’s statutory mandate of prosecuting
and remedying violations of the federal antitrust laws.73
Alternatively, the DOJ may negotiate a cheap decree that
exceeds what it “would have been able to obtain, had it been
forced to litigate the merger case.”74 For example, the relief that
the DOJ may procure through the consent decree may be much
broader than relief that a court would have crafted in its
judgment.75 This occurs when merging parties feel a sense of
urgency to clear the agency’s review process and, as a result,
agree to relatively small divestitures to alleviate the
government’s concerns.76 The sense of urgency may arise from
pressure to raise stock prices through news of a successful
merger as opposed to a dragging, costly litigation.77
A notable example of over-settling is mergers involving
innovation markets,78 an area where antitrust enforcement
73. See 1957 Consent Decree Hearings, supra note 62, at 3 (“[A] question
frequently arises as to whether . . . the consent decree has resulted in a
compromise of the public interest.”).
74. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10–11 (explaining the overdelivering
that occurs in some cheap decrees); see also Savin, supra note 58, at 366 ( “The
government occasionally can secure relief through a consent decree which it
could not win at trial.”).
75. See Savin, supra note 58, at 366 n.16 (stating that the consent decree
“has been widely criticized as a device that transforms the Justice Department
from an adjudicative branch of government into a regulatory agency, because
the relief it can obtain is so broad” (citation omitted)).
76. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10–11 (explaining the pressure that
merging parties face to consent to divesting assets in order for the merger to
clear the agency’s review process); Robert B. Bell, Regulation by Consent
Decree, 26 ANTITRUST 73, 73 (2011) (“Because litigating a merger case entails
risk and litigation can delay closing by a year or more even if the private
parties prevail, parties have been much more inclined to accept
government-demanded settlement terms.”).
77. See Savin, supra note 58, at 366 (asserting that “unfavorable
publicity” is among the many burdens that defendants bear when they engage
in an antitrust litigation).
78. See Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market
Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19, 19–20 (1995) (explaining
the difficulty in assessing antitrust violations in innovation markets).
Innovation markets are those that involve “the research and development
directed to particular new or improved goods or processes.” Id. at 23. The DOJ
and FTC face difficulty enforcing the antitrust laws in innovation markets
because they do not conform to traditional antitrust analysis. Id. at 46
(proposing a new theory for antitrust enforcement in innovation markets); see
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agencies have faced difficulty seeking remedies when litigating
in courts, but are often able to negotiate consent decrees with
the merging parties.79 The agency would not likely receive relief
through litigation, but it is instead able to secure a win by
settling prior to proceeding to litigation.80 Like a consent decree
that underdelivers, a consent decree that contains remedies that
are broader than what the agency would otherwise have been
able to achieve through litigation also fails to serve the public
interest:81 remedies that are not tailored to address antitrust
concerns do not benefit the public interest.82
D.

Judicial Review Under the Tunney Act

Before the Tunney Act, the DOJ’s legal authority to dispose
of litigation by consent decree was an implied power—not
contained in the antitrust laws—”derived from the historical
right of the prosecutor to initiate and conclude legal
proceedings.”83 At the time, this implied power was restrained
by the Supreme Court’s United States v. Swift & Co.,84 which

Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 583
(2012) (summarizing the difficulties that accompany an antitrust analysis of
innovation markets).
79. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10–11 (stating that the FTC “has only
infrequently brought merger cases based on an innovation market theory, and
has never won such a case”).
80. See id. (describing the FTC’s lack of success in challenging innovation
market mergers).
81. See Savin, supra note 58, at 366 n.16 (“[T]he decree has been widely
criticized as a device that transforms the Justice Department from an
adjudicative branch of government into a regulatory agency, because the relief
it can obtain is so broad.”).
82. See DOJ MERGER REMEDIES, supra note 58, at 1 (explaining that the
DOJ strives to ensure that “remedies are based on sound legal and economic
principles and are closely related to the identified competitive harm”).
83. See Charles F. Phillips, Jr., The Consent Decree in Antitrust
Enforcement, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 39, 42–43 (1961) (summarizing the legal
authority upon which the DOJ could enter consent decrees as settlements for
antitrust allegations).
84. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
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imposed a stringent standard that the consent decree must meet
for a court to reject or modify it.85
The Tunney Act codified judicial review and, in so doing,
imposed several procedural requirements that the DOJ must
satisfy when seeking entry of a consent decree:86 the DOJ must
publish its proposed consent decree—along with a “competitive
impact statement” that must detail, among other things, the
nature of the consent decree87—in the Federal Register for at
least sixty days to allow for public comment.88 At the end of the
sixty-day notice and comment period, the DOJ must respond to
all written comments and publish those responses in the Federal
Register.89 The DOJ must also publish the proposed consent
decree and the competitive impact statement in a newspaper for
at least seven days.90 This process is akin to the procedural
requirements for agency rulemakings set forth under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).91
The Tunney Act standardizes the process by which the DOJ
seeks enforcement of its consent decrees.92 Acknowledging the
value of the consent decree to federal antitrust enforcement, the
Tunney Act safeguards against decrees that undermine the
efficacy of settlements and cut against the federal antitrust laws
as a whole.93 In interpreting the Tunney Act, however, courts
85. See id. at 119 (“Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong
evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was
decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned.”).
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (listing the procedural requirements with which
the DOJ must adhere).
87. See id. § 16(b)(1)–(6) (stating the required components of the
competitive impact statement).
88. See id. § 16(b) (providing that the DOJ must publish the proposed
consent decree and the competitive impact statement in the Federal Register
for sixty days).
89. See id. (setting forth the DOJ’s response requirements).
90. See id. § 16(c) (listing the requirements for publication in
newspapers).
91. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring that agencies publish the proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register, receive comments from the public, and
publish responses to those comments).
92. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)(1)–(6) (stating the required components of the
competitive impact statement).
93. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (“Because major antitrust policy
can be implemented through consent decrees, Congress enacted the [Tunney
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have taken steps to artificially narrow the scope of their public
interest review under the Act.94
II.

JUDICIAL NARROWING OF THE “PUBLIC INTEREST” SCOPE
OF REVIEW

The Tunney Act provides that, when deciding whether to
enter the DOJ’s proposed consent decree, “the court shall
determine that the entry of such judgment is in the public
interest.”95 Thus, the plain language of the Tunney Act does not
require, or even contemplate, deference to the DOJ in
mandating the judicial “public interest” review.96 Despite this,
courts consistently place constraints on the scope and depth of
their review.97 In creating the public interest standard,
Congress intentionally declined to define “public interest” in the
statute.98 As a result, “courts were left to formulate their own
standards for evaluating decrees that fit their own definition of
‘public interest.’”99

Act] to exact greater judicial and public scrutiny of antitrust settlements in
suits brought by the government.”).
94. See Savin, supra note 58, at 379 (explaining that courts have
interpreted the Tunney Act in such a way that “may prevent future courts from
conducting an effective Tunney Act review of proposed consent decrees”).
95. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (stating the “public interest” review
requirements).
96. See id. (stating only that the court must make the determination); see
also Lloyd C. Anderson, Mocking the Public Interest: Congress Restores
Meaningful Judicial Review of Government Antitrust Consent Decrees, 31 VT.
L. REV. 593, 593–94 (2007) (“The plain language of the Tunney Act appeared
to require judges to make a de novo determination of whether a proposed
antitrust consent decree was in the public interest, without giving deference
to the executive branch’s view that the public interest would best be served by
a proposed settlement.”).
97. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 593–94 (stating that courts declined
to adopt a de novo standard and instead concluded that the review involve
deference to the DOJ).
98. See Savin, supra note 58, at 372 (“Congress did not attempt to define
‘public interest’ as it preferred the courts to adhere to precedent and derive a
definition from the purpose of the antitrust laws.”).
99. Id. at 374; see Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1003 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the Tunney Act and its legislative
history only provide “a paucity of guidance” in determining the public interest
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Courts initially adopted a deferential approach.100 In so
doing, they adopted a cursory balancing test, which weighed the
benefits to the public against any harms that the consent decree
might confer.101 Remarkably, some courts instead exhibited
agency deference by employing a presumption for the DOJ that
opponents of a settlement could then rebut.102 Courts rooted this
presumption in the notion that a scrutinizing review of the
DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion would implicate separation of
powers concerns.103 This concern was born out of the Supreme
Court’s decision in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States,104
which cautioned against “assessing the wisdom of the [DOJ’s]
judgment” in negotiating settlements.105
Though the Supreme Court decided Sam Fox several years
before the Tunney Act’s promulgation, lower courts applied the
deference articulated within it to the Tunney Act’s judicial
standard), aff’g United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982).
100. See Savin, supra note 58, at 374–77 (summarizing the first judicial
interpretations of the Act’s public interest standard); United States v. Gillette
Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975) (“It is not the court’s duty to
determine whether this is the best possible settlement that could have been
obtained if, say, the government had bargained a little harder. The court is not
settling the case. . . . I must look at the overall picture not
hypercritically . . . .”).
101. See Gillette, 406 F. Supp. at 715 (“Just as the parties are
compromising, so in its process of weighing the public interest, must the
court.”).
102. See United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29,
41 (W.D. Mo. 1975), aff’d, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that the court
“‘decline[d] appellants’ invitation to assess the wisdom of the Government’s
judgment in negotiating and accepting the . . . consent decree, at least in the
absence of any claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government
in so acting” (citing Sam Fox Publ’g Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689
(1961))).
103. See United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“The balancing of competing social and political interests affected by a
proposed antitrust consent decree must be left, in the first instance, to the
discretion of the Attorney General.”); see infra Part IV.B.
104. 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
105. Id. at 689 (summarizing, as a unanimous Court, the need for a
deferential review of actions made pursuant to the DOJ’s prosecutorial
discretion); see Savin, supra note 58, at 376 (explaining that the Sam Fox dicta
led courts to conclude that the Tunney Act did not bestow the courts with
heightened review power).

944

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 925 (2021)

approval process.106 Pursuant to Sam Fox, courts defer to the
DOJ’s conclusion that the consent decree is in the public
interest.107 That presumption is rebutted only by a finding of
“bad faith or malfeasance” on the part of the DOJ in negotiating
the decree.108 Thus, despite evidence in the legislative history
indicating
non-deferential
review,109
courts’
initial
interpretations for consent decree review under the Tunney Act
relied upon legal reasoning that predated the Tunney Act.110
In 1982, however, the D.C. District Court adopted a less
deferential (or perhaps even nondeferential)111 analysis in
United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
(AT&T).112 In AT&T, the trial court required that the
company113 agree to specific modifications to the consent decree
106. See United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 534 F.2d 113,
117 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Sam Fox to affirm the lower court’s deferential
standard of review under the Tunney Act).
107. See Sam Fox, 366 U.S. at 689 (stating that only a showing of “bad
faith or malfeasance” would warrant a scrutinizing review of the DOJ’s
“judgment in negotiating and accepting” a consent decree).
108. See Associated Milk Producers, 534 F.2d at 117
It is axiomatic that the Attorney General must retain considerable
discretion in controlling government litigation and in determining
what is in the public interest. Thus, in our view, the intervention
standard remains that which was stated in Sam Fox: “Bad faith or
malfeasance on the part of the Government” in negotiating and
accepting a consent decree must be shown before intervention will
be allowed.
109. See infra Part IV.A.
110. See Associated Milk Producers, 534 F.2d at 117 (relying on Sam Fox’s
pre-Tunney Act reasoning to interpret Tunney Act review).
111. See Savin, supra note 58, at 378 (“[AT&T] introduced the first
nondeferential approach to reviewing proposed consent decrees.”).
112. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
113. AT&T did not involve a corporate merger. See id. at 135–36. Instead,
the conduct at issue was AT&T’s alleged monopolization of
telecommunications services by its attempt to exclude competitors from the
market. See id. The Tunney Act review and its underlying principles in the
case are the same because the Tunney Act makes no distinction on the scope
of review for mergers versus other antitrust litigation. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b),
(e) (providing that the Tunney Act and its public interest review apply to “any
civil or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under
the antitrust laws”). Thus, this factual distinction does not diminish the
significance of AT&T for this Note.
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prior to it granting approval.114 Notably, the court did so without
finding that the DOJ acted in “bad faith or malfeasance,” as Sam
Fox and its citing precedent prescribe.115 In reaching its
conclusion, the court instead created a new standard for judicial
review: “If the decree meets the requirements for an antitrust
remedy—that is, if it effectively opens the relevant markets to
competition and prevents the recurrence of anticompetitive
activity, all without imposing undue and unnecessary burdens
upon other aspects of the public interest—it will be approved.”116
This heightened the standard for “public interest” review under
the Tunney Act117 and placed the initial burden of proving that
the consent decree was in the public interest on the DOJ.118
The AT&T court justified its exacting review of the consent
decree by citing the magnitude of the litigation (in terms of both
the scale of the corporation and the “enormous undertaking”
required to facilitate the terms of the consent decree).119 The
Supreme Court declined to engage with the Tunney Act’s
judicial review standard in this case by summarily affirming the
district court’s decision without oral argument.120 The only
written opinion in the decision was a dissent from Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White.
114. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 214 (“[I]f the parties accept the Court’s
modifications, the decree as modified will be approved as being in the public
interest . . . .”).
115. See id. at 153 (stating that the court’s decision to impose modifications
to the consent decree was based on an “attempt to harmonize competitive
values with other legitimate public interest factors”).
116. Id.
117. See id. at 151 (“It does not follow from [Tunney Act precedent] that
courts must unquestioningly accept a proffered decree as long as it somehow,
and however inadequately, deals with the antitrust and other public policy
problems implicated in the lawsuit.”).
118. See Savin, supra note 58, at 379 (“This test places the initial burden
on the Justice Department to show that the proposed settlement allows for
free competition and prevents the recurrence of anticompetitive activity.”).
119. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 151–52 (stating that, because AT&T is the
“largest corporation in the world” and the proposed decree would have
“significant consequences,” the court “would be derelict in its duty if it adopted
a narrow approach to its public interest review responsibilities”).
120. See Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1006 (1983)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court issued a summary opinion
without hearing arguments).
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The dissent questioned the constitutionality of the Tunney Act’s
judicial review of an executive function—the decision to
prosecute or settle a case.121 AT&T is the Supreme Court’s only
instance of Tunney Act jurisprudence to date.
Perhaps due to the unordinary aspects of the protracted
AT&T case,122 a series of D.C. Circuit cases subsequently
tightened the public interest review, requiring a high degree of
deference to the DOJ.123 In United States v. Microsoft Corp.,124
the D.C. Circuit concluded that a court’s review of a proposed
consent decree is limited to the allegations contained within the
government’s initial complaint—due to the supposed
constitutional mandate of deference to prosecutorial
discretion—unless the allegations are so narrow that they
constitute a “mockery of judicial power.”125
The D.C. Circuit’s reading of the Tunney Act in Microsoft
created a frictionless process for the DOJ in securing judicial

121. See id. at 1005–06 (“The question assigned to the district courts by
the [Tunney] Act is a classic example of a question committed to the
Executive.”). Justice Rehnquist did not acknowledge that this two-branch
process (the executive branch’s decision to settle followed by the judicial
branch’s decision to approve or deny that settlement) is the exact procedure
prescribed in the criminal plea agreement setting, the constitutionality of
which has not been denied by the Court. See infra Part IV.B.
122. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 151 (stating that a “rubber stamp” was
inappropriate because AT&T “is not an ordinary antitrust case”).
123. See Darren Bush, The Death of the Tunney Act at the Hands of an
Activist D.C. Circuit, 63(I) ANTITRUST BULL. 113, 117 (2018) (“When district
courts sought to reject consent decrees, the D.C. Circuit set them straight to
conform with its notion that courts . . . must defer to the DOJ.”).
124. 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
125. See id. at 1462
[A] decree, even entered as a pretrial settlement, is a judicial act,
and therefore the district judge is not obliged to accept one that, on
its face and even after government explanation, appears to make a
mockery of judicial power. Short of that eventuality, the Tunney Act
cannot be interpreted as an authorization for a district judge to
assume the role of Attorney General.
Microsoft also involved a consent decree related to anticompetitive conduct
rather than an anticompetitive merger. See id. at 1451 (stating that the DOJ
brought the suit against Microsoft alleging that the corporation unlawfully
maintained a monopoly of its operating systems). This, again, is insignificant
to its precedential value in Tunney Act jurisprudence. See supra note 113 and
accompanying text.
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approval of consent decrees: “Since the [DOJ] routinely drafts
the complaint after crafting the proposed order, this standard
would very rarely result in rejection of a proposed order.”126 This
process is efficient127 but contrary to the goals of the Tunney
Act.128
Two years later, in Massachusetts School of Law at
Andover, Inc. v. United States,129 the D.C. Circuit built upon its
holding in Microsoft to further limit its role.130 The court did so
by transforming the deferential “mockery” concept into an entire
standard of review.131 Citing Microsoft, the court stated that the
reviewing court “should withhold approval [of a consent decree]
only if any of the terms appear ambiguous, if the enforcement
mechanism is inadequate, if third parties will be positively
injured, or if the decree otherwise makes ‘a mockery of judicial
power.’”132 This “mockery” standard limited Tunney Act judicial
review even further, granting more power to the DOJ to
successfully secure consent decrees.133

126. ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (explaining the Microsoft decision’s
effect on the DOJ’s ability to seek entry of its consent decrees); Savin, supra
note 58, at 380 (“If a court may consider only the relationship between the
actual allegations and the remedies in the decree, the Department of Justice
can secure judicial approval by submitting a complaint tailored to a
prenegotiated settlement.”).
127. See Savin, supra note 58, at 365–66 (noting the efficiencies that
accompany resolving antitrust concerns by consent decree).
128. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 452 (remarks by Sen.
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (explaining that Congress enacted
the Tunney Act to eliminate judicial rubberstamping).
129. 118 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
130. See id. at 783 (“In part because of the constitutional questions that
would be raised if courts were to subject the government’s exercise of its
prosecutorial discretion to non-deferential review . . . we have construed the
public interest inquiry narrowly.” (citing Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1457–59)).
131. See id. (holding that the court must examine the decree based on
certain factors “or if the decree otherwise makes ‘a mockery of judicial power’”);
United States v. SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35–36 (explaining that
Massachusetts School of Law’s “formulation of the ‘mockery’ concept
apparently casts it as a standard of review, to be used unless there are other
specific problems with the consent decree”).
132. Mass. Sch. of L. at Andover, Inc., 118 F.3d at 783.
133. See Bush, supra note 123, at 120 (stating that the “mockery” standard
“expressly limits intervention in consent decrees to exceptionally rare
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Thus, since the Tunney Act’s enactment, courts have taken
steps to meaningfully restrict its public interest review.134 The
judiciary has done this by interpreting the Tunney Act to
require significant agency deference when engaging in public
interest review and, relying on pre-Tunney Act dicta,
understanding constitutional concerns to profoundly constrain
the scope of the district court’s review.135 These developments
prompted Congress to take action by amending the Tunney Act
in 2004.136
III. CONGRESS’S RESPONSE: THE 2004 AMENDMENTS TO THE
TUNNEY ACT
Courts’ failures to engage in robust, nondeferential review
signaled a return to the judicial rubber stamping that Congress
sought to prevent.137 The D.C. Circuit’s deferential
interpretation of the Tunney Act’s judicial review mandate,138
operating at its peak with Massachusetts School of Law’s
“mockery” standard, prompted Congress to reevaluate the
Tunney Act in the early 2000’s and amend the legislation in
2004.139
circumstances” and “further places extreme deference into the hands of the
DOJ”).
134. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 594–95 (stating that the D.C.
Circuit’s jurisprudence on the Tunney Act reduced the court’s role to “merely
ministerial in nature”).
135. See supra notes 104–133 and accompanying text.
136. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(e)(1)) (summarizing the amendments to the Tunney Act); Anderson,
supra note 96, at 606 (explaining that Congress acted in response to the D.C.
Circuit precedents that narrowed the Tunney Act review).
137. See Bush, supra note 123, at 135 (explaining that the federal court’s
permissive, deferential application of the Tunney Act created a “return to
[pre-Tunney Act] judicial rubber-stamping of consent decrees”).
138. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 594 (noting that the “decades-long
consensus” regarding meaningful Tunney Act review “unraveled in the 1990s
in a string of decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia”).
139. See Bush, supra note 123, at 122 (“Displeased with the cases in the
D.C. Circuit that suggested that the only route for the courts was to
rubber-stamp final judgments proposed by the DOJ, Congress sought to
establish more clearly the intended consequences of the Tunney Act.”).
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The Revised Tunney Act

Congress addressed the concern that judicial review
devolved into pre-Tunney Act rubber stamping140 by amending
the Tunney Act in 2004.141 In so doing, Congress attempted to
clarify the extent to which courts should scrutinize a negotiated
consent decree when engaging in Tunney Act review.142
Congress’s efforts produced two changes.143 First, Congress
made express judicial findings to reinforce the Tunney Act’s
purpose and scope.144 Congress achieved this by explicitly
superseding the Massachusetts School of Law “mockery”
standard.145 Second, Congress altered the language of the
statute’s public interest review provision.146 To require a more
exacting judicial review, Congress replaced the permissive
“may” with “shall” in stating that “the court shall consider”
140. See 150 CONG. REC. S3615 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2004) (remarks by Sen.
Herbert Kohl) (introducing a bill to amend the Tunney Act because “many
courts seem to have ignored [the] statute and do little more than ‘rubber
stamp’ antitrust settlements”).
141. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(e)(1)) (providing the various textual changes to the public interest
standard that a reviewing court will apply).
142. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 595 (“A bipartisan effort was
launched in the U.S. Senate to overturn the D.C. Circuit’s ‘mockery’ standard
and restore meaningful judicial oversight.”); Bush, supra note 123, at 122
(explaining that Congress amended the Tunney Act to “compel[] courts to
undertake a meaningful Tunney Act review”).
143. See Anderson, supra note 96, at 595–96 (summarizing the two
provisions contained in the Tunney Act amendments).
144. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 668
Congress finds that the (A) purpose of the Tunney Act was to ensure
that the entry of antitrust consent judgments is in the public
interest; and (B) it would misconstrue the meaning and
Congressional intent in enacting the Tunney Act to limit the
discretion of district courts to review antitrust consent judgments
solely to determining whether entry of those consent judgment
would make a “mockery of the judicial function.”
145. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
146. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 668–69 (listing Congress’s modifications
to the provision of the Tunney Act that instruct courts on the public interest
review, 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)).
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certain factors in conducting its public interest review.147
Despite these concrete efforts on the part of Congress, courts
interpreted the amendments as having little effect on existing
precedent.148
B.

Judicial Application of the Revised Tunney Act

The D.C. District Court was the first to conclude that the
amendments
were
inconsequential
to
Tunney
Act
jurisprudence.149 In United States v. SBC Communications,150
the court determined that “a close reading of the law
demonstrates that the 2004 amendments effected minimal
changes,”151 and added that its standard of review “remains
sharply proscribed by precedent.”152 The court did, however,
hold that the amendments expressly overruled the
Massachusetts School of Law broadened interpretation of the
“mockery” concept, which construed it as an entire standard of
review for Tunney Act courts to follow.153 The SBC
Communications court ultimately decided that the amendments
preserved Microsoft’s “mockery” concept as good law because
that only applied to the narrowness of the complaint rather than
to the scope of judicial review.154
147. See id. (stating the statutory changes to the Tunney Act public
interest review language); see also Anderson, supra note 96, at 596 (stating
that the amendments “make it mandatory—not merely discretionary—for
courts to consider various factors in making the public interest
determination”).
148. See Lawrence M. Frankel, Rethinking the Tunney Act: A Model for
Judicial Review of Antitrust Consent Decrees, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 549, 570
(2008) (explaining that the 2004 amendments “may not have represented a
change in the law” and that they “did little to solve the Act’s underlying
problems”).
149. See United States v. SBC Commc’ns, 489 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C.
2007) (summarizing the minimal influence of the amendments on Tunney Act
caselaw).
150. 489 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007).
151. Id. at 11.
152. Id.
153. See id. at 36–37 (“The statutory language appears to overrule
Massachusetts School of Law’s use of the ‘mockery’ standard of review.”).
154. See id. at 38–40 (concluding that “nothing in the text or legislative
history of the 2004 amendments undermines [Microsoft’s] reasoning”).
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Therefore, Congress’s effort to reanimate an exacting
judicial review through the 2004 amendments seems
fruitless.155 As the judiciary’s consistently high level of agency
deference and limited judicial review of consent decrees persist,
“the DOJ can assure merging parties that pre-Tunney hearing
consummation is fine because the chances of a court rejecting
the consent decree are zero.”156 This eliminates the entire
purpose of Tunney Act review.157
IV. THE TUNNEY ACT DEMANDS LESS AGENCY DEFERENCE
The consent decree is an effective and commonly employed
tool to achieve the goals of federal antitrust enforcement.158
Motivations specific to both the DOJ and the merging parties,
however, create the risk that consent decrees are being agreed
upon not for their ability to advance the public interest, but to
achieve these other motivations.159 The Tunney Act demands
exacting review by the courts, which is critical to ensuring that
only those consent decrees that serve the interests of the public
are entered into force.160
Until this point, however, the majority of courts have
misinterpreted the congressional mandate in the Tunney Act to
afford too much deference to the DOJ when engaging in the
public interest review. Courts should confer a lower degree of
deference to the DOJ when engaging in Tunney Act public

155. See Bush, supra note 123, at 123 (“Review, or more precisely lack of
review, of consent decrees continued as if the Tunney Act amendment had not
passed.”).
156. Id. at 114.
157. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 452 (remarks by Sen.
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (explaining that Congress enacted
the Tunney Act to charge the judiciary with independent review to ensure that
inadequate consent decrees are not entered into force).
158. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (noting that 80 percent of
antitrust litigation is settled and most of those settlements are achieved by
consent decree).
159. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
160. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 449 (remarks by Sen.
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (stating that the public interest
review charges the judiciary with “an independent duty to assure itself that
entry of the decree will serve the public generally”).
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interest review for three reasons: (1) less agency deference is the
correct reading of the statute and the statute’s legislative
history, (2) less agency deference does not pose an
unconstitutional imbalance between the judicial and executive
branches, and (3) less agency deference is crucial for containing
harmful effects of anticompetitive mergers.
A.

Less Agency Deference is the Correct Reading of the Statute
and the Legislative History161

Congress drafted the Tunney Act so the judiciary would
play an active, nondeferential role in the antitrust settlement
process.162 This arose from concerns regarding the DOJ’s
settling of major antitrust litigation through consent decrees
with little to no judicial oversight.163 For the purposes of this
Note, a comparative analysis of the legislative histories and
statutory frameworks of the important antitrust statutes
through which the FTC and DOJ operate is beneficial. This
subpart compares the FTC and DOJ through two lenses: (1) the
DOJ as the prosecutor of antitrust laws versus the FTC’s role as
an independent, expert adjudicator,164 and (2) the divergent
consent decree procedures between the two agencies.165 The
distinctions that exist between the FTC and DOJ are not
accidental on the part of Congress, and they support this Note’s
conclusion that Congress enacted the Tunney Act to require an
exacting judicial review of the DOJ’s consent decrees.166

161. See Savin, supra note 58, at 364 (arguing that the Act’s legislative
history “reveal[s] a clear mandate for critical and nondeferential judicial
review of proposed consent decrees”).
162. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 449 (remarks by Sen.
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (“The court is not to operate simply
as a rubber stamp, placing an imprimatur upon whatever is placed before it
by the parties. Rather it has an independent duty to assure itself that entry of
the decree will serve the public generally.” (emphasis added)).
163. See id. (stating that “[c]oncern has been renewed about the standards
and the safeguards which apply when the stakes are high” and the stakes are
high for antitrust).
164. See infra Part IV.A.1.
165. See infra Part IV.A.2.
166. See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
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First, because the DOJ is the federal government’s
prosecutorial body and is afforded wide jurisdiction to prosecute
both civil and criminal laws (including criminal antitrust
statutes), courts have misinterpreted the Tunney Act and its
legislative history to account for deference in the form of
prosecutorial discretion in administering Tunney Act review of
civil consent decrees.167
Second, because the DOJ is a non-expert, executive agency
(in contrast to the FTC, which is an expert, independent
agency), legislative history reveals understandable skepticism
regarding the DOJ’s ability to appropriately settle antitrust
claims by consent decree.168 As a result of this skepticism,
Congress believed that independent judicial approval (as
opposed to the FTC’s current process, which allows for internal
approval and a mechanism for external judicial review only on
appeal) was necessary to ensure that the DOJ’s settlement of
antitrust litigation by consent decree serves the public
interest.169 Thus, the procedural distinction between the FTC
and DOJ reveals a deliberate judicial approval function in
protection of the public interest in DOJ consent decrees.
1.

The DOJ as Antitrust Prosecutor

Courts restrain their Tunney Act review by invoking the
doctrine of prosecutorial discretion.170 Prosecutorial discretion
likely gained traction in Tunney Act jurisprudence because of
two DOJ-specific principles: (1) the DOJ is the federal

§ 16(e)(1)) (publishing a congressional finding that courts should conduct the
review to advance the public interest).
167. See infra Part IV.A.1.
168. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 453 (remarks by Sen.
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (providing that the public interest
review is meant to identify the inevitable instances when the DOJ’s judgment
was unreasonable).
169. See id. at 452 (remarks by Sen. John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward
Gurney) (stating that independent judicial review of a consent decree is
necessary to ensure that the DOJ’s judgment in agreeing to the settlement was
appropriate).
170. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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government’s “prosecutor,”171 and is therefore associated with
the well-established doctrine of deference to “prosecutorial
discretion,”172 and (2) the DOJ enforces antitrust laws in both
the civil and criminal contexts,173 the latter of which allows
judges to extend the DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion to the realm
of federal antitrust enforcement.174 By contrast, there is no such
discussion with regard to deference to the FTC under the
doctrine of prosecutorial discretion.175
Deference to prosecutorial discretion is well-accepted
because it promotes flexibility and adaptability to case-specific
factors in prosecutorial decision-making.176 It is especially
well-established in the criminal context, with some sources
acknowledging the doctrine exclusively in this setting.177
Because the DOJ is charged with executing the laws under the
constitutional powers vested to the President, courts apply
prosecutorial discretion to the agency.178 Moreover, the DOJ has

171. See About the Office, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://perma.cc/S2PMGNUQ (last updated July 17, 2018) (“The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the
Office of the Attorney General which evolved over the years into the head of
the Department of Justice and chief law enforcement officer of the Federal
Government.”).
172. See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1971) (“Prosecutors in
Anglo-American legal systems, both as a matter of theory and in practice, have
considerable discretion in making their decisions.”).
173. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42–43 (noting that the DOJ has
jurisdiction to prosecute both civil and criminal provisions in antitrust
statutes).
174. See Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial
Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 408–09
(discussing the DOJ’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion in bringing criminal
indictments under the Sherman Act).
175. See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611–13 (1946) (stating that
the FTC has “wide discretion in its choice of a remedy” but making no mention
of the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion).
176. See Abrams, supra note 172, at 2–3 (summarizing the advantages of
prosecutorial discretion in the legal system).
177. See Review, Prosecutorial Discretion Part II: Preliminary
Proceedings, 34 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 197, 199 (2005) [hereinafter
Prosecutorial Discretion] (“Courts recognize broad discretion to initiate and
conduct criminal prosecutions . . . .”).
178. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“The
Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to
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jurisdiction to enforce the antitrust laws by issuing criminal
indictments,179 which reinforces the applicability of
prosecutorial discretion to the DOJ.180
The applicability of prosecutorial discretion to the DOJ with
respect to the Tunney Act fails, however, for two reasons. First,
the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion risks inconsistency,
uncertainty, and arbitrariness.181 In the Tunney Act context,
those risks produce cheap decrees, which is precisely what the
drafters envisioned the statute’s judicial review mechanism
would protect against.182 Second, though the DOJ indeed has
jurisdiction to enforce the criminal provisions of federal
antitrust laws, Tunney Act review is a purely civil inquiry.183 As
such, the judiciary’s extension of prosecutorial discretion to the
Tunney Act is misplaced.184
2. The Distinct Procedural Mechanisms for DOJ and FTC
Consent Decrees Reveal Congress’s Desire to Impose an Active
Judicial Review
Both agencies use consent decrees,185 but the FTC and DOJ
follow different procedures to pursue enforcement of their
enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.” (citations omitted)); infra note 245 and
accompanying text.
179. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (noting that the DOJ has
authority to enforce the criminal provisions of the antitrust statutes).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Bonnet-Grullon, 212 F.3d 692, 701 (2d Cir.
2000) (“It is well established that the decision as to what federal charges to
bring against any given suspect is within the province of the Executive Branch
of the government.”).
181. See id. at 3 (noting the “competing tension between the need in
prosecutorial decision-making for certainty, consistency, and an absence of
arbitrariness on the one hand, and the need for flexibility, sensitivity, and
adaptability on the other”).
182. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 449 (remarks by Sen.
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (explaining that the purpose of the
public interest judicial review mechanism is to protect against the “bad or
inadequate” consent decrees); see also infra Part IV.C.
183. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (limiting the consent judgment process to only
civil proceedings that the DOJ brings).
184. See infra Part IV.B (analogizing the DOJ’s role in the Tunney Act
consent decree process to the criminal plea agreement context, which similarly
involves a judicial approval requirement).
185. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
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decrees, and the caselaw pertaining to each procedure is
distinct.186 The Tunney Act does not apply to FTC consent
decrees.187 Instead, FTC consent decrees are approved or denied
by the commission itself,188 and it enjoys “wide discretion” in its
decision to settle an antitrust violation by consent decree.189
DOJ consent decrees, on the other hand, require approval
by a federal district court judge pursuant to the Tunney Act.190
The Tunney Act requires judges to determine whether the DOJ’s
negotiated consent decree “is in the public interest” prior to
approving it.191 Antitrust scholars note a distinction between the
court’s role in judicial review (FTC) and judicial approval (DOJ)
of a consent decree.192 Judicial approval is a mandatory part of
the Tunney Act procedure, while judicial review is a device by
which a party may seek an appeal of an already final consent
decree.193
This procedural distinction between the two agencies—
principally, the FTC’s lack of a mandatory judicial approval
mechanism—is
telling.
Recognizing
the
“specialized,

186. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (describing the distinctions
between FTC and DOJ consent decree approval procedure).
187. See id. (comparing the approval procedure for DOJ consent decrees
and FTC consent decrees).
188. See id. (“[T]he Commission both proposes orders and
then . . . approves them in final form.”).
189. See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611–13 (1946) (“The
Commission has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to
cope with the unlawful practices in this area of trade and commerce.”).
190. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (explaining the Tunney Act
requirements that the DOJ must satisfy in seeking approval of a consent
decree).
191. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (“Before entering any consent judgment
proposed by the United States under this section, the court shall determine
that the entry of such judgment is in the public interest.”); see also supra notes
98–100 and accompanying text.
192. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 3 n.6 (distinguishing “judicial approval,”
which “requires that a federal district court approve a settlement as being in
the public interest[,] . . . from ‘judicial review,’ which merely refers to an
appeal or petition for review [of a final FTC settlement] to a federal court of
appeals”).
193. See id. at 3 (stating that the FTC “does not have . . . a procedure for
judicial approval—unlike consent decrees entered into by the [DOJ]”).
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experienced judgment”194 of the FTC, courts repeatedly conclude
that the agency retains the “primary responsibility for
fashioning orders.”195 Courts must also give “wide discretion”196
to the FTC in its crafting of the appropriate consent decree.197
Congress did not implement this procedural scheme
inadvertently.198 Unlike the DOJ, Congress created the FTC as
“the expert body to determine what remedy is necessary to
eliminate” the identified antitrust violations.199 In FTC v.
Cement Institute,200 the Supreme Court spoke directly to
congressional intent:
Congress when it passed the [Federal] Trade Commission
Act felt that courts needed the assistance of men trained to
combat monopolistic practices in the framing of judicial
decrees in antitrust litigation. Congress envisioned a
commission trained in this type of work by experience in
carrying out the functions imposed upon it.201

194. See Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413 (1958) (stating that
“it is ordinarily not for courts to modify ancillary features of a valid
Commission order” because the FTC “is called upon to exercise its specialized,
experienced judgment”).
195. FTC v. Nat’l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 429 (1957).
196. See Jacob Siegel Co., 327 U.S. at 611–13 (“The Commission has wide
discretion in its choice of a remedy deemed adequate to cope with the unlawful
practices in this area of trade and commerce.”).
197. See Nat’l Lead, 352 U.S. at 428–29 (stating that “Congress had placed
the primary responsibility for fashioning orders upon the Commission” in
summarizing the U.S. Supreme Court’s deferential approach to reviewing FTC
consent decrees).
198. See FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 726 (1948) (“There is a special
reason, however, why courts should not lightly modify the Commission’s
orders made in efforts to safeguard a competitive economy.”).
199. See Jacob Siegel Co., 327 U.S. at 612 (explaining the role of the FTC
in enforcing antitrust laws); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
624 (1935) (“The commission is to be non-partisan; and it must, from the very
nature of its duties, act with entire impartiality. It is charged with the
enforcement of no policy except the policy of the law. Its duties are neither
political
nor
executive,
but
predominantly
quasi-judicial
and
quasi-legislative . . . .”).
200. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
201. Id. at 726.
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Thus, Congress foresaw the FTC filling an expert role in
advising on antitrust decree concerns for the courts and,
notably, for the DOJ.202
The FTC filling such a role is embedded in the text of the
Federal Trade Commission Act itself.203 The Federal Trade
Commission Act provides that a court—after the end of
testimony in a lawsuit brought by the DOJ under the antitrust
laws—may “refer said suit to the commission, as a master in
chancery, to ascertain and report an appropriate form of decree
therein.”204 The court may adopt or reject the FTC’s report as it
deems appropriate.205 Congress viewed this advisory power as
an important one: it “will bring both to the Attorney General and
to the court the aid of special expert experience and training in
matters regarding which neither the Department of Justice nor
the courts can be expected to be proficient.”206
Conversely, Congress implemented a mandatory judicial
review function as part of the Tunney Act for the DOJ because
of the “major antitrust policy [that] can be implemented through
consent decrees.”207 Out of a concern that the DOJ was
improperly disposing of antitrust lawsuits by consent decree,208
Congress deemed the mandatory judicial review function
necessary “to exact greater judicial and public scrutiny of
antitrust settlements in suits brought by the government.”209

202. See id. at 726–27 (summarizing the FTC’s expert role and the Federal
Trade Commission Act’s provision that allows for assistance to the DOJ).
203. See 15 U.S.C. § 47 (explaining the interaction between the FTC,
courts, and the DOJ regarding consent decrees).
204. Id.
205. See id. (“[T]he court may adopt or reject such report, in whole or in
part, and enter such decree as the nature of the case may in its judgment
require.”).
206. S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 12 (1914) (discussing the legislative proposal to
create the FTC).
207. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 42 (explaining the DOJ consent
decree process).
208. See Savin, supra note 58, at 377 (“The elaborate procedures created
by the Tunney Act are designed to provide an opportunity to correct the errors
of the Justice Department, an opportunity wasted by a deferential court.”).
209. See id. at 366 (explaining why the judicial review was imposed).
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The DOJ is firmly rooted in the executive branch.210 The
Attorney General heads the DOJ211 and serves as “the hand of
the President;”212 the Attorney General aids the President in
executing the laws under the Take Care Clause.213 The Attorney
General is appointed by the President,214 serves as a member of
the President’s cabinet and, as a result, may be removed at will
and without cause by the President.215 The DOJ Antitrust
Division’s Assistant Attorney General, who is also appointed by
the President,216 reports directly to the Attorney General.217 The
Assistant Attorney General determines DOJ antitrust policy
and internal prosecutorial decision-making.218 As a result, the
Assistant Attorney General’s opinions on antitrust enforcement
play a major role in determining which antitrust cases the
agency pursues.219 Though the Assistant Attorney General is
often well-qualified in the field of antitrust,220 she operates as a
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 501 (“The Department of Justice is an executive
department of the United States at the seat of Government.”).
211. See id. § 503 (“The Attorney General is the head of the Department of
Justice.”).
212. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (“The Attorney
General is the hand of the President in taking care that the laws of the United
States in legal proceedings and in the prosecution of offenses, be faithfully
executed.”).
213. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 5 (“[The President] shall take care that
the laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).
214. See 28 U.S.C. § 503 (“The President shall appoint, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, an Attorney General of the United States.”).
215. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163 (1926) (concluding that
executive officers that are “appoint[ed] by the President with the consent of
the Senate . . . are subject to removal by the President alone, and any
legislation to the contrary must fall as in conflict with the Constitution”).
216. 28 U.S.C. § 506 (“The President shall appoint, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, 11 Assistant Attorneys General, who shall assist
the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”).
217. See ROGERS ET AL., supra note 2, at 39 (describing the leadership
structure of the DOJ’s antitrust arm).
218. See id. (“Division policy and prosecutorial discretion are set by the
Assistant Attorney General . . . .”).
219. See id. at 39–40 (summarizing the drastically different approaches to
antitrust enforcement depending on who held the position of Assistant
Attorney General at the time); see also supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
220. For example, William Baer, Assistant Attorney General under the
Obama Administration, “is a leader of the antitrust bar” and was previously
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single decision-making authority and is directly accountable to
the political motivations of the President.221
A recent example of potential political influence was the
DOJ’s uncharacteristic efforts to block a vertical merger: the
now-consummated AT&T-Time Warner merger in 2017.222
Neither the DOJ nor the FTC had brought a lawsuit to enjoin a
vertical merger in over forty years.223 Nonetheless, the DOJ
proceeded with litigation to enjoin the AT&T-Time Warner
deal.224 The DOJ was unable to cite to any recent caselaw to
support its position.225 The D.C. District Court, ruling against
the DOJ, concluded that the merger could proceed as planned,
and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.226 Reports indicate that Donald
Trump’s outspoken opposition to the merger influenced the
DOJ’s decision to challenge the deal.227
the Director of the Bureau of Competition at the FTC. See STACEY ANNE
MAHONEY, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT UNDER PRESIDENT OBAMA: WHERE HAVE
WE BEEN AND WHERE ARE WE GOING? 2–3 (2013), https://perma.cc/3HSWVQMZ (PDF) (referring to Baer as “extremely well regarded” and stating that
he has enjoyed an “exceptionally successful career”). Christine Varney, Baer’s
predecessor, is a leading US antitrust lawyer and the only person to have
served both as Assistant Attorney General and as a Commissioner at the FTC.
Lawyers: Christine A. Varney, CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, https://
perma.cc/2HJZ-G95T (summarizing Christine Varney’s antitrust expertise).
221. See Burton Raffel, Presidential Removal Power: The Role of the
Supreme Court, 13 U. MIAMI L. REV. 69, 75 (1958) (“The principal tool left to
the President for securing the loyalty, responsibility and control of the officers
of the government is discretionary removal power.”).
222. See James B. Stewart, AT&T-Time Warner Decision Shows Need to
Rethink Antitrust Laws, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018), https://perma.cc/VR82TMTT (detailing the DOJ’s decision to sue to enjoin the merger between AT&T
and Time Warner).
223. See id. (“The last time the government brought such a case was in
1979.”).
224. See Complaint at 2, United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161
(D.D.C. 2018), No. 1:17-cv-02511, ECF No. 1 (stating that the United States
brought a civil action to enjoin the merger because it would substantially
lessen competition).
225. See Stewart, supra note 221 (“[T]he Justice Department, which sued
to prevent the deal, could not cite a single recent precedent for blocking it.”).
226. See United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 254 (D.D.C.
2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (denying the DOJ’s request to
enjoin the proposed merger).
227. See Jane Mayer, The Making of the Fox News White House, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZG58-KVDD (reporting that “Trump
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By contrast, Congress structured the FTC to exist as an
independent agency, insulated from politics in the executive
branch.228 Thus, the FTC’s consent decrees require public
interest review by the commission itself, which is composed of a
five-member panel of bipartisan, antitrust experts.229 The DOJ’s
unilateral authority differs greatly from a bipartisan panel of
expert commissioners, who, for example, are not subject to the
President’s at will removal powers.230 Congress, therefore, was
understandably concerned that the consolidated power
structure inherent to the DOJ faces a greater risk of creating
outcomes contrary to the public interest.231
B.

Less Agency Deference Does Not Pose an Unconstitutional
Imbalance Between the Judicial and Executive Branches

Courts consistently cite constitutional separation of powers
concerns in support of narrowing Tunney Act judicial review.232
Judicial deference owed to government agencies is part of a
larger discussion regarding its constitutionality—namely, the
debate surrounding Chevron233 deference and the caselaw that
espouses similar principles.234 Independent of the outcome of
ordered Gary Cohn, then the director of the National Economic Council, to
pressure the [DOJ] to intervene”); see also Hadas Gold, Report: Trump Asked
Gary Cohn to Block AT&T-Time Warner Merger, CNN, https://perma.cc
/3KQA-73B7 (last updated Mar. 4, 2019, 4:53 PM) (stating that “Trump’s
animosity towards the merger is no secret,” as he “repeatedly talked about
wanting to block it on the campaign trail and in office”).
228. See Sunstein, supra note 10 (explaining that there are two types of
government agencies—executive and independent—and noting that the DOJ
is executive and the FTC is independent).
229. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (stating that the
commission is composed of five commissioners, with no more than three of the
commissioners being members of the same political party).
230. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935)
(holding that the president cannot remove an FTC commissioner “during the
prescribed term for which the officer is appointed, except for one or more of the
causes named in the applicable statute”).
231. See supra notes 206–209 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text.
233. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
234. See id. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department’s construction of a statutory
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that debate,235 courts’ use of a lower degree of agency deference
does not implicate constitutional concerns. This conclusion is
supported by analogy: it is not a constitutional concern in the
federal criminal plea agreement context, which involves a
similar process.236
The procedural requirements to which the DOJ must
adhere when entering a federal criminal plea agreement and the
requirements to seek entry of a proposed consent decree
remedying an antitrust violation are remarkably similar.237
While the Tunney Act mandates the procedure that the
government must follow to enforce civil consent decrees,238 Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (the “Rules”)
governs the process by which the government may enter a
federal criminal plea agreement.239
The plea agreement and consent decree both come after the
agency has already exercised its “prosecutorial discretion” in
bringing the complaint or indictment and after its subsequent

scheme it is entrusted to administer . . . .”); see also John F. Manning,
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 613 (1996) (noting that “Chevron
deference has preoccupied administrative law scholarship in a way few issues
ever have”).
235. See Manning, supra note 234, at 613 (“Exhaustive academic
commentary has scrutinized Chevron’s legitimacy, and explored the seemingly
innumerable questions that arise from its application.”).
236. See Bush, supra note 123, at 114 (“[T]his setting is no different than
the countless thousands of plea bargains that are handled in the criminal
context. In those instances, courts have broad discretion to reject plea
bargains. . . . Prosecutorial discretion is preserved, as are the powers of Article
III courts.”).
237. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3) (providing that the court must
accept a plea agreement before it is entered), with 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1)
(requiring that the court make a public interest determination in deciding
whether to enter the consent decree). In addition, scholars note the similarity
between the Tunney Act’s judicial approval requirement and the judicial
approval requirement for shareholder derivative suits in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.1. See Savin, supra note 58, at 380–82 (“Neither the Tunney Act
nor Rule 23 intended for the reviewing court merely to rubber-stamp whatever
settlement was proposed by the parties.”).
238. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (requiring that the DOJ follow certain steps when
seeking enforcement of a consent decree).
239. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (providing the procedural rules regarding the
negotiation and entry of a plea agreement).
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decision not to continue prosecuting the charge or litigating the
claim.240 The three phases of the plea agreement process are
analogous to consent decree approval under the Tunney Act: (1)
the plea agreement negotiation that occurs between the
parties,241 (2) the submission of the proposed plea agreement to
the court,242 and (3) the court’s review and ultimate judgment.243
The negotiation stage—the first phase of the plea
agreement process—involves the government’s exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.244 The court’s absence from this phase
is appropriate; courts routinely conclude that judicial review is
inappropriate where the executive branch is exercising its
discretion in determining whether to pursue, dismiss, or settle
charges.245 Such interference would constitute a violation of
separation of powers and an infringement upon the
government’s prosecutorial discretion.246 This notion is
expressly codified in the Rules: a court cannot participate in plea
agreement negotiations that occur between the defendant and
the government.247 This is also captured by the Tunney Act: the
240. See Bush, supra note 123, at 128 (describing the point at which plea
agreements and consent decrees come into play).
241. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (discussing the procedure for plea
agreement negotiations).
242. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2) (mandating disclosure of the proposed
plea agreement to the court).
243. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4) (providing the structure for judicial
review and approval of the plea agreement).
244. See Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 177, at 199 (explaining that
prosecutorial discretion involves the prosecutor’s “far-reaching authority to
decide whether to investigate, grant immunity, negotiate a plea bargain, or
dismiss charges”).
245. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“The
Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to
enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.” (citations omitted)); Newman v. United
States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (stating that “few subjects” are less
suited for judicial review than the executive branch exercising its prosecutorial
discretion).
246. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (“[A]s an
incident of the constitutional separation of powers, . . . the courts are not to
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary power of the attorneys of
the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions.”).
247. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (“An attorney for the government and the
defendant’s attorney . . . may discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court
must not participate in these discussions.”).
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parties only submit a proposed consent decree to the court once
the terms within it have been agreed upon.248
Once the negotiations result in a plea agreement, the
government must then offer it in open court—the second phase
of the process.249 At this point, the court’s involvement is
permissible because this phase triggers a judicial function; the
government has exercised its prosecutorial discretion in
deciding to reach a plea agreement with the defendant, and then
submits it to the court for approval.250 The Tunney Act mandates
a similar procedure: the government must file the consent
decree with the court and publish it in the Federal Register “at
least sixty days prior to the effective date of such judgment.”251
This phase explicitly marks the point at which prosecutorial
discretion ends and judicial review begins.252
In the final stage of the plea agreement process,
responsibility shifts to the court to review the plea agreement as
part of its judicial function and render a decision on it.253 The
court in the criminal plea agreement context, like in the Tunney

248. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (explaining that the court’s involvement in the
consent decree does not begin until the parties submit a proposed consent
decree to the court).
249. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(2) (“The parties must disclose the plea
agreement in open court when the plea is offered . . . .”). This rule also seems
to implicate the entrenched notion that criminal justice should be adjudicated
in the public eye. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580
(holding that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees
of the First Amendment”). Interestingly, the same concern arose in the
legislative debate surrounding the Tunney Act procedures. See 1957 Consent
Decree Hearings, supra note 62, at 3 (stating that criticisms of the consent
decree process prior to Tunney Act enactment stem from “the fact that the
entire process is surrounded by secrecy”).
250. See Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 177, at 197–99 (explaining
that prosecutorial discretion involves the government’s power to determine
how to proceed with a case).
251. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b).
252. See Bush, supra note 123, at 128 (“Although the DOJ certainly has
the right to dismiss a civil or criminal antitrust complaint or negotiate a
settlement with any party, the right of prosecutorial discretion ends when a
court is asked to exercise its power to enter a consent decree.”).
253. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)(A) (“[T]he court may accept the
agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until the court has reviewed the
presentence report.”).
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Act,254 must approve the parties’ settlement proposal prior to it
taking effect.255 This is a “judicial function”256 and does not
implicate separation of powers concerns.257 The same principles
apply in the Tunney Act context.258 Responsibility shifts from
the executive branch to the court to review the consent decree
and render a decision on it.259
This analogy reveals that—in conferring an inappropriate
amount of deference to the DOJ—courts are failing to
distinguish between the executive’s role in negotiating a
proposed settlement and the court’s subsequent role in
reviewing the consent decree and granting its entry.260 The
Tunney Act prescribes a two-step process that involves the
participation of two branches of government performing their
distinct roles.261
In fact, the Constitution’s separation of powers system
demands this distinct role for the judiciary.262 The judiciary’s
254. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1) (requiring that the court make a public
interest determination in deciding whether to enter the consent decree).
255. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4) (“If the court rejects the plea
agreement, . . . the agreed disposition will be included in the judgment.”).
256. See Savin, supra note 58, at 377–78 (“Although negotiations involve
administrative decisions by the Justice Department, a court’s entry of a
consent decree is a judicial function.”).
257. See Bush, supra note 123, at 114 (explaining that both prosecutorial
discretion and the power of the courts are preserved during the plea agreement
process).
258. See id. (“[The Tunney Act] setting is no different than the countless
thousands of plea bargains that are handled in the criminal context.”).
259. See id. at 127 (stating that “the act of deciding to enter a decree” is a
judicial function and not an executive branch function “entrusted solely to the
discretion of the DOJ”); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932)
(“We reject the argument . . . that a decree entered upon consent is to be
treated as a contract and not as a judicial act.”). The entry of a consent decree
as a judicial act is a long-held principle that predates the Tunney Act. See
Phillips, Jr., supra note 83, at 44 (explaining that by 1928 the U.S. Supreme
Court had established that the entry of a consent decree is a judicial act).
260. See supra notes 249–259 and accompanying text.
261. See Savin, supra note 58, at 377–78 (“Entry of a consent decree is a
judicial act, and therefore the decree is subject to the court’s inherent equitable
power to refuse to enter any judgment not in the public interest.”).
262. See Bush, supra note 123, at 129 (“Because the entry of a decree is an
inherently judicial function, it cannot be the case that the Court should be
obligated to defer to the DOJ . . . .”).
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abdication of an exacting review through deference to the DOJ,
therefore, “could itself represent an unconstitutional
infringement on judicial power.”263 Moreover, if this Note were
to extend the concept of the DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion in
Tunney Act review and frame it as a Chevron inquiry, this too
would fail by analogy to the criminal plea agreement context.264
The U.S. Supreme Court concludes that agency deference is
inapt for criminal statutes.265
Therefore, analogy to the criminal plea agreement process
reveals a process of judicial review that is consistent with the
requirements set forth in the Constitution.266 Courts should
eliminate the artificial restraints that it has imposed on its
Tunney Act review by acknowledging that deference to the DOJ
is inappropriate when the court is charged by statute with an
independent duty to approve or deny a settlement.
C.

Less Agency Deference is Crucial to Containing Harmful
Effects of Anticompetitive Mergers

When a reviewing court affords too much deference to the
DOJ, it removes the procedural protections Congress designed
to ensure that only those antitrust settlements that are in the
public interest are approved.267 Only a scrutinizing,
263. See Savin, supra note 58, at 377 n.102 (“Such a denial would arguably
prevent the court from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned function of
enforcing the laws of the United States as a court of equity.”).
264. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
265. See Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 191 (2014) (“[C]riminal
laws are for courts, not for the Government, to construe.”); Gutierrez-Brizuela
v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing
Abramski, 573 U.S. at 191)
The Supreme Court has expressly instructed us not to apply
Chevron deference when an agency seeks to interpret a criminal
statute. Why? Because, we are seemingly told, doing so would
violate the Constitution by forcing the judiciary to abdicate the job
of saying what the law is and preventing courts from exercising
independent judgment in the interpretation of statutes.
266. See supra notes 249–259 and accompanying text.
267. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 449 (remarks by Sen.
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (explaining that the purpose of the
independent judicial review is to protect against the “bad or inadequate”
consent decrees).
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non-deferential review can decipher between settlements that
advance the public interest versus those that were agreed upon
based on objectionable motivations—cheap decrees.268
Cheap decrees269 undercut the entire utility of enforcement
by settlement and serve as a primary example of why the
Tunney Act warrants independent, non-deferential review.270
Congress imposed a mandatory judicial approval mechanism in
the Tunney Act to prevent cheap decrees like those described
above,271 and robust judicial review prevents those cheap
decrees.272 Therefore, it is incumbent upon courts to reanimate
their role in Tunney Act review to thoroughly assess the merits
of consent decrees prior to their entry into force.
V.

A PATH FORWARD

In one of the most recent examples of Tunney Act
jurisprudence, the D.C. District Court rejected the notion of
“rubber stamp” review in CVS’s acquisition of Aetna.273
Highlighting the importance of an exacting review, the CVS
Health court stated, “Indeed, if the Tunney Act is to mean
anything, it surely must mean that no court should rubberstamp
a consent decree approving the merger of one of the largest
companies in the United States and the nation’s third-largest
health-insurance company, simply because the Government
requests it!”274
Because of the merger’s far-reaching effects,275 the court
conducted hearings and received extensive briefings to address

268. See supra Part I.B.1.
269. See supra notes 64–69.
270. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 10 (stating the negative effects of cheap
decrees).
271. See supra Part IV.A.
272. See ROSCH, supra note 66, at 9–11 (explaining the concept of “cheap
decrees” and their detrimental effects).
273. See United States v. CVS Health Corp., 407 F. Supp. 3d 45, 48 (D.D.C.
2019) (stating that “with so much at stake, the congressionally mandated
public interest inquiry must be thorough”).
274. Id. at 48 (citation omitted).
275. See id. (“Its effects, for better or for worse, will be felt by millions of
consumers.”).
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the concerns voiced by industry participants.276 In the opinion,
the court noted particular concerns with the DOJ’s
“perfunctory” response to the large volume of comments that the
DOJ received during the mandatory notice and comment period
and the unsubstantiated confidence with which the DOJ
defended the consent decree in the responses.277
Notably, the court clarified—and, in so doing, potentially
broadened—the D.C. Circuit’s holding in Microsoft, which
provided that the reviewing court’s inquiry under the Tunney
Act is limited to the claims contained in the DOJ’s complaint.278
Criticizing the DOJ’s attempt to use Microsoft to limit the scope
of the review, Judge Leon stated that the arguments “severely
understate the permissible scope of a Tunney Act review.”279 The
court distinguished between claims and harms: Microsoft stands
for the proposition that the reviewing court cannot “evaluate
claims that the government did not make,”280 but the D.C.
Circuit never suggested that “allegations in the complaint are
the only harms courts may consider in a Tunney Act review.”281

276. See id. (stating that the record was “meaningfully supplemented by
the briefs and testimony presented by the parties and amici curiae”); Brent
Kendall, Judge Approves Settlement Allowing CVS-Aetna Merger, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 4, 2019, 7:30 PM), https://perma.cc/ZQ8G-3FWK (explaining that, “in a
first for a court review of a government merger settlement,” Judge Leon heard
live testimony from third parties).
277. See CVS Health, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 50 (“To say the least, [the DOJ’s]
response left much to be desired. It is rife with conclusory assertions that
merely reiterate the Government’s confidence in its proposed remedy, but shed
little light on the reasons for that confidence.”). These steps are part of the
procedural requirements set forth under the Tunney Act. See supra notes
86– 91 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 124–128 and accompanying text.
279. See CVS Health, 407 F. Supp. 3d at 52–53 (stating that the DOJ relied
on Microsoft to attempt to persuade the court that it should disregard the
criticisms posed by the amici curiae as outside the review’s scope).
280. Id. at 53 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1451
(D.C. Cir. 1995)).
281. See id. (stating that “such a holding would have contradicted the
Tunney Act itself”); id. at 53–54 (“The Government’s suggestion here—that by
narrowly drafting a complaint it can effectively force the Court to shut its eyes
to the real-world impact of a proposed judgment—thus misconstrues
Microsoft.”).
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Judge Leon explained that such a holding would “strike[] at the
heart of the Tunney Act’s very purpose.”282
After a thorough review, the court ultimately approved the
consent decree.283 A signal of change or an outlier among
deferential precedent, Judge Leon’s hands-on review in United
States v. CVS Health is a needed reanimation of the Tunney
Act’s congressional mandate. As such, the D.C. Circuit should
adopt Judge Leon’s claims versus harms distinction for the
Tunney Act’s scope of review and clarify its holding from
Microsoft to reflect such language.284 In doing so, the D.C.
Circuit should make clear that courts are not prevented from
engaging in a meaningful review of a proposed consent decree
with respect to the harms that may accrue with the public as a
result of the merger.285 As the court states, “Neither the statute,
nor Microsoft, supports such a meaning.”286
CONCLUSION
A court’s deferential review of proposed consent decrees
under the Tunney Act dilutes the independent judicial review
mechanism designed by Congress to a mere “rubber stamp”
process.287 By simply deferring to the DOJ and imposing
artificial constraints on its scope of review, courts are unable to
conduct a meaningful review of the effects of a proposed merger
on the public. Less agency deference, therefore, is critical to
ensuring that the goals of the Tunney Act are met. Without such

282. Id. at 54.
283. See id. (granting the government’s motion to enter the proposed
consent decree because the settlement satisfied public interest review under
the Tunney Act).
284. See United States v. CVS Health Corp., 407 F. Supp. 3d 45, 52–53
(D.D.C. 2019) (summarizing the court’s clarification of the Microsoft
reasoning).
285. See id. at 54 (stating that “judicial evaluation of . . . alleged harms
raises no constitutional issue”).
286. See id. (explaining that the DOJ has misinterpreted the D.C. Circuit
precedent).
287. See 1973 Tunney Act Hearings, supra note 15, at 452 (remarks by Sen.
John V. Tunney and Sen. Edward Gurney) (fearing that, absent the Tunney
Act, the court “operate[s] simply as a rubber stamp”).
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review, the goals embedded in the Tunney Act’s public interest
provision are lost.288
Courts should afford less deference to the DOJ when
engaging in the Tunney Act’s public interest review and
reanimate their statutorily mandated duty to independently
determine whether allowing a merger to go forward on the terms
contained within the decree is in the public interest.

288.

See supra note 274 and accompanying text.

